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Abstract
Our paper proposes an original angle to study the free-rider problem in
the provision of public goods when the regulator has no information about
agentspreferences. For a given outcome - specically a Lindahl allocation
- we ask what assumptions have to be imposed on simple mechanisms (in
a precisely dened sense) that have the ability to Nash-implement it. Our
answer lies in two main results: i) transfers necessarily belongs to a class
of mechanims that are linear in individual contributions to the public
good, ii) there exists a subset of this class that fully implement Lindahl
allocations. This subset encompasses, but does not reduce to, Walker
(1981).
JEL codes: H41, C72, D62, D82.
Keywords: Lindahl allocations, mechanism design.
1 Introduction
How could a public authority cope with free-riding temptations in the provision
of public goods when relevant pieces of information about contributors are not
available? A substantial literature that addresses this archetypical regulation
problem has accumulated over the past decades. The theoretical literature is
made of two blocks.
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The rst one consists of a collection of papers, each o¤ering a mechanism
with the ability - once in place - to remove the original discrepancy between
individual and collective rationalities. In other words a mechanism modies the
rules of the game so that resulting non-cooperative equilibria are also Pareto
optimal allocations. It answers the question: given a theory of agents behav-
iors along with a particular distribution of the information, can we exhibit a
mechanism that remove the free-rider problem?
The second stream starts with the notion of a social choice function (SCF). It
addresses the following question: for the prevailing information structure and the
appropriate concepts of equilibria, what kind of SCF could ever be implemented
- or decentralized? One typically obtains general possibility or impossibility
results, but do not get a particular explicit mechanism. For instance, a well-
known result states that if a SCF is implementable in Nash equilibrium, then it
is monotonic (Maskin, 1999). Overall, this second stream provides an axiomatic
picture on SCF that are implementable or not.
The present paper proposes a conceptual shift. We attack the problem from
a third angle, which is a mixture of the two approaches described above. For a
given outcome - specically a Lindahl correspondence - we ask: what properties
have to be imposed on the mechanisms that have the ability to Nash implement
the given outcome? In other words, we axiomatize the means rather than the
targets. We restrict attention to simple mechanisms, by which we mean functions
that depend only of the prole of contributions to the public good. It is showed
that simple mechanisms for attaining Lindahl allocations must satisfy a system
of di¤erential equations, that we call LDS (Lindahl Di¤erential System). From
LDS, two theorems are derived: i) Theorem LT establishes the existence of
a unique class of simple mechanisms that solve LDS; and it also shows that,
in this class, transfers to agent i are linear functions of his contribution, ii)
Theorem LLT singles out a subclass of mechanisms for Lindahl allocation that
encompasses, but does not reduce to, Walker (1981).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the standard public
good framework and its Lindahl equilibria. Section 3 introduces simple Nash-
mechanisms for implementation of Lindahl allocations, and it axiomatizes this
class of mechanisms. Section 4 concludes.
2 A public good economy and its Lindahl equi-
libria
There are n  2 agents. Each agent is generically labelled i (i = 1; :::; n) ; and
is endowed with an exogenous income yi > 0: He has two decision variables, a
contribution gi  0 to a public good and his consumption ci  0 of a private
good. There is no initial endowment of the public good G; which results from
individual contributions via a production technologyG = G(g1; :::; gn)  0. Each
agent i has a preference relation dened over bundles (ci; G) ; which admits a
numerical representation U i (ci; G; i) ; a continuous and increasing function of
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its arguments ci and G. Agent is preference depends on a parameter - or type
- denoted i ; taken in an open set i v R of the real numbers, i 2 i. We
assume that the Hessian matrix of U i (:; :; i) is denite negative, therefore this
function is concave with respect to (ci; G) :
Let y = (y1; :::; yn) be the vector of exogenous incomes, g = (g1; :::; gn) the
vector of contributions, U =
 
U1; :::; Un

the vector of utility functions and
 = (1; :::; n) the vector of types (vectors are in bold characters). A public
good economy1 is a quadruplet
e  (y;G;U;) 2 
 ;
for some set 
 of possible economies. In this paper we focus on a pure public
good economy, where G(g) = Pni=1 gi is the simple aggregation of individual
contributions. A feasible allocation is a vector (c1; :::; cn ; G) 2 Rn+1+ such thatPn
i=1 ci + G 
Pn
i=1 yi: The set of all feasible allocations is a function of the
vector of incomes and is denoted F (y).
The logic of a Lindahl equilibrium can be presented as follows. Imagine that
each agent can choose his own public good Gi; for which he has to pay an
individualised price  i (or cost share). His problem is to choose the pair (ci; Gi)
so as to maximize U i (ci; Gi; i) subject to the individual budget constraint:
ci +  iGi = yi : (1)
Optimal interior decisions for agent i solve the rst order condition2 :
U i2
 
yi    iGi; Gi; i

U i1 (yi    iGi; Gi; i)
MRSi  yi    iGi; Gi; i =  i; 8i: (2)
Those equations implicitly dene each individual demand for the public good:
Gi = L
i (yi;  i; i) ; 8i:
A Lindahl equilibrium for an economy e 2 
 is dened as a vector (1; :::; n)
of prices and a level of public good G such that:
nX
i=1
i = 1 ; (3)
G = Li (yi; i ; i) ; 8i: (4)
For future reference, let the set of interior Lindahl allocations - or Lindahl
correspondence - be dened as:
L (e) = f(fci gni=1 ; G) v F (y) such that (1) - (4) are satisedg : (5)
1There are many pedagogic presentations of economic environments with public goods. For
instance Oakland (1987). For a textbook introduction, see La¤ont (1988), Cornes and Sandler
(1996, part III) or, more recently, Hindriks and Myles (2013), Chapter 6.
2Since the Hessian of U i is denite negative, one can check that the second order condition
for a maximum is also satised.
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Combining (1),(2), (3) and (4), one can deduce:X
i
ci +G
 =
X
i
yi ; (6)
and:
nX
i=1
MRSi (ci ; G
; i) = 1 ; (7)
which is the well-known Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition (BLS, see for in-
stance La¤ont, 1988) for Pareto Optimality, i.e. Lindahl equilibria lead to
Pareto optimal allocations. Actually, they have been considered as the natural
extension of the notion of a competitive equilibrium for economies with private
goods when public goods are involved (see the surveys o¤ered by Milleron, 1972,
Section III, and Roberts, 1974). An important consequence is that, at Lindahl
allocations, adapted versions of the First and Second Welfare Theorems can be
established for economies with public goods (see Foley, 1970, Milleron, 1972).
In addition, Lindahl allocations respect various requirements, in terms of fair
sharing of the cost of the public good (Buchholz and Peters, 2007), that explain
the particular attention they have attracted over decades. In particular:
i) They are in the core of the economy (Foley, 1970, Section 6), so agents, alone
or in groups, presumably have no rational reasons to object the Lindahl
outcome.
ii) They are individually rational in following the sense:
U i (yi   iG; G; i)  U i (yi; 0; i) ;8i;
meaning that each participant is at least as well-o¤ at the Lindahl alloca-
tion as he would have been had the public good not been provided3 . This
is a particular case of a more general fairness property - voluntariness -
established by Silvestre (1984)4 .
iii) they are envy-free when all agents are endowed with the same exogenous
income: no agent would like to interchange his Lindahl bundle with the
Lindahl bundle of another agent (Sato, 1987),
iv) When the public good is a normal good, at a Lindahl price system, richer
agents contribute more: due to the income e¤ect, the larger the income,
the larger the demand for the public good; but since at the equilibrium
everybody consumes the same amount, rich agents face a higher price.
3This denition of individual rationality should not be confused with another possible
denition, which would require that a move from a Nash voluntary contribution equilibrium
to a Lindahl equilibrium would make everyone better-o¤. This is a di¤erent issue, addressed
in Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998). In general, not all agents prefer the Lindahl equilibrium over
the Nash outcome.
4Voluntariness requires that no agent is better-o¤ after a reduction of his contribution that
is accompanied by a reduction of the public good in the same proportion. See Sylvestre (1984,
Section 3).
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Despite those appealing allocative properties, Lindahl equilibria face well-
known problems when it comes to implementation. Agents are assumed to be-
have as price-takers, even though they are unique agents on the demand side of
their respective market for the public good or, are assumed to reveal truthfully
their quantity demanded of the public good at each given price. This consti-
tutes an important obstacle for the implementation of a Lindahl equilibrium5 .
Economists in the last decades have looked for alternative ways for extracting
truthful information, using Implementation Theory and the concept of a game
form.
3 A public good game form
Denote G i the (n  1)-dimensional vector made of contributions other than
gi, and let g i =
P
h6=i gh stand for the sum of the other agentscontributions.
Suppose an incentive scheme is put in place where each agent i pays or makes
a transfer:
T i
 
gi;G
 i :
Those transfers (a subsidy when T i < 0; a tax when T i > 0), can be used to
dene a public good game form (PGGF). Let T =
 
T 1; :::; Tn

stand for the
vector of transfers put in place. A PGGF consists of: i) n action compact sets
Sh  R;8h = 1; :::; n, where an action is a contribution to the public good,
ii) a set of feasible outcomes (c1; :::; cn; G) 2 F (y) ; iii) an outcome function
 : ni=1S
i  R+  ! F (y) ; given more precisely by:
 (g;y) 
 
y1   g1 + T 1
 
g1;G
 1 ; :::; yn   gn + Tn  gn;G n ; nX
i
gi
!
:
In a game form, contrary to a standard game, payo¤ functions are not exoge-
nously given. They are endogenously determined so that a pre-specied outcome
of interest emerges as an equilibrium of strategic choices from the agents. In this
paper, our institution design - or mechanism design - problem is to characterize
necessary conditions for an outcome function  (g;y), or equivalently a game
form, to admit Nash equilibria that are also a Lindahl allocations.
A few mechanisms have been proposed in order to Nash-implement a Lindahl
allocation (Hurwicz, 1979, Walker, 1981, Tian, 1989, Nakamura, 1989, Vega-
Redondo, 1989, Kim, 1993, de Trenqualye, 1994, Li, Nakamura and Tian, 1995,
Chen 2002, Van Hessen, 2013, Rouillon, 2013). Not all those mechanisms belong
to the class of mechanisms that can be associated to the PGGFs and the family
of transfers T i
 
gi;G
 i we are using in this paper. For instance Kim (1993),
de Trenqualye (1994), Chen (2002), Van Hessen (2013) and Rouillon (2013)
5See Samuelson (1954). For this reason, Lindahl equilibria are also called Lindahl pseudo-
equilibria.
5
rest of more sophisticated strategy spaces, for they require that agents report
their prediction about the other agents contributions, or about the level of
public good that will be provided. Put di¤erently, in order to encompass those
mechanisms we would have to start with extended strategy spaces and a more
complex class of transfers. We defend our simpler framework for its realism.
Transfers whose amounts are partly conditioned to forecasts about decisions,
despite their conceptual interest, have been criticized because they do not appear
to be natural or they are lacking simplicity. See the survey in Moore (1992, in
particular Section X of part I). This concern for simple mechanisms appears in
various forms in the theoretical and experimental literatures. Recent examples
of the former are Baskar, Sen and Vohra (1995), Segal (2007); and for the latter
see Bracht, Figuières and Ratto (2008), Iyengar and Kamenica (2010), or Midler,
Figuières and Willinger (2015).
Throughout the paper, we impose some regularity on transfers:
Assumption 1 (C1). Each T i
 
gi;G
 i is of class C1:
In the sequel, transfers that satisfy C1 are said to be regular. Assumption
C1 ensures that the outcome function  is also C 1, so that small changes in an
agents choice does not result in large changes in the ensuing allocation. Insights
gained in such games are robust when agents are slightly uncertain about rivals
strategies6 . For more details, see Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989).
Let fbgigni=1 be a Nash equilibrium of the PGGF. At such an equilibrium, tak-
ing as given the equilibrium prole of otherscontributions, agent i contribution
gi maximizes
U i

yi   gi + T i

gi; bG i ; gi + bg i; i :
If T igi is the partial derivative of T
i with respect to gi; the rst order condition
for an interior optimal decision is:
MRSi
bci; bG; i = 1  T igi ; (8)
for each agent i.
Dene NT (e) as the set of interior Nash equilibria7 of the PGGF dened by
the prole of transfers T . Those particular allocations,

fbcigni=1 ; bG 2 F (y)
6Actually, it is su¢ cient that  be continuous to guarantee this result.
7Our analysis applies to PGGF that admit Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Su¢ cient
conditions for the existence of such Nash equilibria are easy to nd out, but they are also
more restrictive than one would like. They would ask that the composite function:
V i
 
gi; G
 i; i
  U i  yi   gi + T i  gi; G i ; gi + g i; i
be continuous and quasi-concave with respect to gi; 8G i. In general this has to be a joint
property of U i and T i; unless more structure is imposed. For instance, a particular case of
interest that meets these conditions is
V i
 
gi; G
 i; i

= yi   gi + T i
 
gi; G
 i+ ivi (gi + g i) ;
where vi (gi + g i) is a C2 function, and in addition d
2
(dG)2
vi  0 and @2
(@gi)
2 T
i  0.
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necessarily satisfy (8). Ideally, one would like to identify the class of transfers
that fully implements the Lindahl correspondence:
T L 
n
T =

T i
 
gi;G
 i	n
i=1
such that NT (e) = L (e) ; 8e 2 

o
:
A less ambitious requirement would be to achieve Pareto optimality. For that
purpose, the condition to be imposed on transfers is easy to identify. Summing-
up the equations (8) over the agents:
nX
i=1
MRSi
bci; bG; i = n  nX
i=1
T igi : (9)
Compare the above equation (9) with the BLS equation (7), and a require-
ment immediately follows: if an interior Nash equilibrium of the PGGF corre-
sponds to a particular interior Pareto optimal allocation

fbcigni=1 ; bG, transfers
necessarily meet the following requirement:
Axiom 1 (Transfers for Pareto Optimal Allocations (TPOA)). For a
given Pareto optimal allocation
bgi; bG i ; corresponding transfers are such that
nX
i=1
T igi
bgi; bG i = n  1: (10)
If in addition transfers are required to be balanced, at and o¤ equilibrium,
then:
Axiom 2 (Budget Balance (BB)).
nX
i=1
T i
 
gi;G
 i = 0; (11)
for any arbitrary
 
gi;G
 i.
Not all the existing mechanisms are balanced in the strong sense required by
the axiom BB8 . For instance Kim (1993), de Trenqualye (1994), Chen (2002),
Van Hessen (2013) and Rouillon (2013), are balanced only when agents play the
Nash equilibrium. Our main reason for imposing BB is pragmatic. Although
one may hope that agentsbehavior conforms with what the theory predicts,
one may also expect that few agents will make out-of-equilibrium decisions. As a
8A weaker form requires that transfers be weakly balanced, in the sense:
nX
i=1
T i
 
gi;G
 i  0; (12)
for any arbitrary
 
gi;G
 i.
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result, there may remain a decit or a surplus of money. A decit is problematic
because it means that the funding comes at the expense of other sectors in the
economy (or future agents / generations). And a surplus is problematic as well.
Because it could be redistributed to all agents and create a Pareto improvement,
but at the same time this redistribution could undermine the incentive properties
of the mechanism under consideration.
With transfers of the form T i
 
gi;G
 i, identifying conditions (8) with (2),
(3) and (4), if a Nash equilibrium of the PGGF is also a Lindahl equilibrium,
necessarily, 8i = 1; :::; n;8e 2 
:
U i2
 
yi   gi + T i
 
gi;G
 i ; gi + g i; i
U i1 (yi   gi + T i (gi;G i) ; gi + g i; i)
= 1  T igi =  i ;
gi   T i
 
gi;G
 i =  iG ;
nX
i=1
 
gi
G
  T
i
 
gi;G
 i
G
!
=
nX
i=1
 i = 1:
Or, getting rid of the individualized prices:
U i2
 
yi  
 
1  T igi
 G;G; i
U i1
 
yi  
 
1  T igi
 G;G; i = 1  T igi ; (13)
gi   T i
 
gi;G
 i =  1  T igi G ; (14)
G 
nX
i=1
T i
 
gi;G
 i = G : (15)
Equation (13) is useless from an implementation perspective, because it requires
information about utility functions that is not known to the mechanism designer.
However, it indicates explicitly that the mechanism relies on a behavioral as-
sumption, that rationality is of the usual "utility-maximizer" kind. Equation
(15) is automatically satised provided that transfers are budget-balanced.
The second equation, or the set of second equations since there is one equa-
tion (14) for each agent, is crucial. It reveals a structure about the kind of
transfers we are looking for. They must solve (14) for any Lindahl allocation
in L(e). Since the institution designer does not know the agentspreferences (in
particular the vector  of parameters), the prole of sought transfers must be
built without resorting to such pieces of information, i.e. transfers must solved
this set of equations 8e 2 
: The set of public good economies we consider en-
compasses cases where the Lindahl allocations vary continuously with the vector
. Therefore transfers must satisfy (14) not only at a particular point
 
gi;G
 i
but on a manifold of Lindahl allocationsM; i.e. 8  gi;G i 2 M. This means
(14) cannot be considered as a set of equations; it must be viewed as a system of
non autonomous di¤erential equations, to which a natural initial condition can
be specied. Consider a particular Lindahl allocation
 fci gni=1 ; G 2 L (e) :
Denote:
T i = T i
 
gi ;G
 i ;
8
the numerical value of agent is transfer when computed at this Lindahl alloca-
tion. Then the set of equations (14) can be rewritten:
Denition 1 (Lindahl Di¤erential System (LDS)).(
T igi
 
gi;G
 i = T i(gi;G i)G + 1  giG ;
T i
 
gi ;G
 i = T i ; 8i; 8  gi;G i 2M: (16)
For a manifold of Lindahl allocations, LDS singles out a particular system
of non autonomous di¤erential equations whose solutions

T i
	n
i=1
are transfers
with the ability to induce the considered Lindahl allocations.
Actually, we can be much more precise about regular transfers that respect
LDS:
Theorem (Linear Transfers (LT)). There exists a unique class of regular
transfers that abides by LDS. In this class, transfers take the form:
T i
 
gi;G
 i = Ai  G i  gi + Ai  G i  1  g i ; (17)
for some function Ai
 
G i

.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary vector of admissible contributions
 
gi ;G
 i to serve
as an initial condition. If one holds G i constant then LDS is an ordinary non
autonomous di¤erential equation. Since each T i
 
:;G i

is C1 (AssumptionC1),
the partial derivative T igi is continuous over its domain of denition, S
h, which
is compact. Therefore T igi has an upper bound, meaning that T
i
 
:;G i

is Lip-
schitz continuous with respect to the rst argument, for all admissible G i.
Then by application of the Cauchy-Lipschitz Theorem there exists a unique
(local) solution to equation LDS. And because of Assumption C1 this solu-
tion varies continuously with G i (still in application of the Cauchy-Lipschitz
Theorem): This proves the rst statement of the theorem (uniqueness). As for
the second statement, it is easy to check that (17) indeed solves equation LDS,
so it gives the unique solution we are looking for.
Expression (17) is the rst main nding of this paper. Its statement sub-
stantially reduces the possibilities for transfers formulae. It denes a class of
transfers that encompasses but is not limited to T L9 . A natural follow-up ques-
tion is whether theTPOA property is guaranteed for transfers (17). The answer
is a¢ rmative provided the condition BB is also imposed.
Corollary 1. If a prole of transfers

T i
 
gi;G
 i	n
i=1
respects C1, BB and
LDS at a particular allocation

fbgigni=1 ; bG, then it also respects TPOA atbgi; bG i.
9More on this below.
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Proof. According to Theorem 3, summing transfers that respect LDS at
bgi; bG i
one nds:
nX
i=1
T i
bgi; bG i = nX
i=1
Ai
 bG i  bgi + nX
i=1
h
Ai
 bG i  1i   bG  bgi ;
= bG  nX
i=1
Ai
 bG i  (n  1)  bG = 0 ;
where the last equality is obtained by virtue of BB. This last expression sim-
plies to:
nX
i=1
Ai
 bG i = n  1 :
Because transfers are of the form (17), observe that Ai
 bG i = T igi bgi; bG i :
Therefore:
nX
i=1
Ai
 bG i = n  1 , nX
i=1
T igi
bgi; bG i = n  1 ;
which is the TPOA axiom.
The class of such transfers therefore fully implements the Pareto correspon-
dence. Let us single out this class of transfers:
T P 
n
T =

T i
 
gi;G
 i	n
i=1
such that C1; BB and LDS are respected
o
:
Note that T P can still be large. Walker (1981) lies in the class of transfers
(17). Indeed, setting:
Ai
 
G i

= 1 

1
n
+ gi+2   gi+1

:
yields Walkers mechanism and one can check that it indeed abides by LDS.
Setting:
Ai
 
G i

= 1  1
n
; 8i;
yields Falkingers mechanism and also respects LDS, though it does not nec-
essarily implements a Lindahl allocation. Further arguments are necessary to
discriminate among the elements of T P . The set of Lindahl allocations is nar-
rower. The initial condition in system LDS would obviously add precision about
Ai
 
G i

in formula (17), in order to implement a particular Lindahl allocation.
However such an information is typically not available in our implementation
framework.
Despite this lack of information, a subset of T P that fully implements Lin-
dahl allocations can be found. Consider a Lindahl equilibrium, with a vector of
individual prices  = (1; :::; 

n) and a level of public good G
. Under what
10
condition do transfers of the form indicated in Theorem LT (i) yield a vector
of non-negative contributions g = (g1 ; :::; g

n) that sum up to G
 and such that
the share of each individual contribution is gi =G
 = i ? And (ii) achieve (i) for
any Lindahl allocation
 
gi ;G
 i 2 M? Using (2) and (13), we are therefore
looking for a set of functions Ai (:) that solve the system:(
i =
gi
G = 1 Ai
 
G i

; 8i; 8  gi ;G i 2M ;X
i
gi = G
 :
(18)
Clearly if Ai (:) is a constant function, this is impossible. Consider then the class
of linear functions: Ai
 
G i

=  +
Pk
h=1 hgi+h where k can be any integer
between 2 and n 1 and the subscripts i+h are dened so that i+h = i+h n
whenever i + h > n: Walkers transfer is a particular case where k = 2 and
2 =  1 = 1.
Because at a Lindahl price system
P
i = 1; a rst deduction drawn from
(18) is:
n (1  ) 
nX
i=1
kX
h=1
hg

i+h = 1 ; 8
 
gi ;G
 i 2M :
Therefore, since this equation is supposed to hold for all proles
 
gi ;G
 i 2
M :
 = 1  1=n ;
kX
h=1
h = 0 ; (19)
where the second equality obtains because:
nX
i=1
kX
h=1
hg

i+h = G

kX
h=1
h :
This shows that, for the class of transfers whereAi
 
G i

= +
Pk
h=1 hgi+h;
conditions (19) form necessary conditions to implement a Lindahl allocation.
Conditions (19) are also su¢ cient conditions, for we can establish that the
system (18) now has a unique solution:
Lemma 1. For a given prole of Lindahl prices fi gni=1 and a given Lindahl
level of public good G, the system (18) with functions Ai
 
G i

= (n  1)=n+Pk
h=1 hgi+h ;
Pk
h=1 k = 0; has a unique solution.
Proof. If the determinant of the linear system (18) is di¤erent from 0 then a
solution exists and it is unique. The matrix of the system is:
M =
266666666664
1 1 1 1       1
0  1  2  3        n 1
 n 1 0  1  2        n 2
 n 2  n 1 0  1        n 3
 n 3  n 2  n 1 0      
...
...
...
...
...
. . .    ...
 2  3          0  1
377777777775
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Suppose, by way of contradiction, that Det(M) = 0. This means that the
column vectors C1; :::; Cn; of matrix A are linearly dependent. In this case we
can exhibit real numbers i; i = 1; :::; n   1; such that the last column vector
Cn can be expressed as:
Cn = 1C1 + :::+ n 1Cn 1
For the rst line of the matrix, this would mean:
1 + :::+ n 1 = 1; (20)
For the second line, we would have:
1  0 + 2  ( 1) + 3  ( 2) + :::+ n 1 
  n 2 =  n 1 : (21)
But we also know, for the chosen class of functions Ai
 
G i

; that:
n 1 =  
 
1 + 2 + :::+ n 2

; (22)
and therefore, using (21) and (22):
1 + 2 + :::+ n 2 = 21 + 32 + :::+ n 1n 2 :
Repeating the logic with the third line, one obtains:
1 
  n 1+ 2  0 + 3  ( 1) + :::+ n 1    n 3 =  n 2 :
And because:
n 2 =  
 
1 + 2 + :::+ n 3 + n 1

;
necessarily:
1 + 2 + :::+ n 3 + n 1 = 1n 1 + 31 + :::+ n 1n 3 :
This can be repeated for any line, and overall it is easy to check that there is
only one possibility i = 1;8i = 1; ::; n   1; in contradiction with (20), hence
the conclusion of the lemma.
We now consider the reverse question, that is let one starts with this class
of transfers and check if one arrives at a Lindahl equilibrium. From individual
best responses (8), we have:
MRSi = 1  T igi = 1 Ai
 
G i

;
=
1
n
 
kX
h=1
hgi+h ; i = 1; :::; n : (23)
The above best responses correspond indeed to a situation where individual
Lindahl prices are:
i =
1
n
 
kX
h=1
hgi+h :
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And summing-up all these expressions (23):
X
i
MRSi =
X
i
i = 1 
X
i
kX
h=1
hgi+h ;
and thus: X
i
MRSi = 1; (24)
because:
nX
i=1
kX
h=1
hg

i+h = G

kX
h=1
h = 0 :
Lemma 1 along with (23) and (24) establish our second theorem, which gener-
alizes Walkers mechanism:
Theorem (Linear Lindahl Transfers (LLT)). Take an economy e 2 
 with
at least three agents. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the Nash
equilibrium generated by the class of transfers:
T i
 
gi;G
 i =  n  1
n
+
kX
h=1
hgi+h
!
 gi +
"
1
n
+
kX
h=1
hgi+h
#
 g i ;
kX
h=1
h = 0 ;
and the Lindahl allocation of e.
4 Summary
This paper focuses on the implementation of Lindahl allocations by means of
simple transfers. Our contribution is to identify some structure in the set of such
transfers. We establish two main results: i) Theorem LT states the conditions
under which transfers are linear, ii) Theorem LLT identies a whole class of
linear transfers - which generalizes Walkers formula (1981) - that implements
a Lindahl allocation.
A follow-up to the approach that we use would be to start with other families
of transfers a priori given - for instance, transfers may also be conditioned
on observable socio demographic categories - and then determine under what
conditions it is possible to achieve a Lindahl allocation via such transfers.
13
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